Video Nieswand English

https://youtu.be/rCgYbd1BAE8

Hello, my name is Boris Nieswand, I'm a professor of sociology at the University of Tubingen, and my special focus is migration and diversity. When I speak today to you, I speak as a migration scholar. So I'm not an theologian or a person in religious studies, but somebody who is interested in the study of migration. I tell you this information because I think it helps you to understand my specific perspective and my take on superdiversity or diversity.

I want to talk about three issues in this talk that are related, in my opinion, to the question of superdiversity. The *first point* is a more **social structural** aspect. I will tell you and give you some information about diversification. This means that increasingly global flows of migration lead, especially in the metropolitan areas of Western European countries, but also many other countries on the globe to diversification. This means that in a specific place, we have people from *more* countries with *more* languages, with *more* religions, with *more* educational backgrounds, with *more* genders and so on. So, we see a multidimensional process of diversification that is related to processes of global migration that manifest particularly in the global cities.

Secondly, I want to tell you something about **categorization**. This point is about that diversity is not such a simply a thing in the world that exists independent of the observers, but that the way we understand diversity relates very strongly on the categories we apply on a certain population, whether we use ethnicity, religion, education. How we measure it will lead to different outcomes of what we perceive as diversity. So, diversity is also a process that is intrinsically linked to the categories of the observers.

And *third,* I want to tell you something about the **social imaginary** and the question, what is the impact of superdiversity or diversity of the social imaginary. If I talk about social imaginary, I assume that in societies at a certain point of time, there are visions and ideas about how people in a society connect to each other and how they should

arrange their social relationships. Diversity, in contrast to all the imaginary, tells us that we are all different according to different aspects. This might be a possibility of imagining the society in the 21st century that is significantly different from the imagined areas of the 19th or 20th century. I will explain all this points now in further detail. I hope you can follow my argumentation and we can discuss all the questions you have and all the observations that my elaborations might stimulate in the Online Seminar in which I hope to see you soon.

I would like to start my presentation with some general remarks on the **concept of superdiversity** that was coined by *Steven Vertovec* in a Journal article in "Ethnic and racial studies" in 2007. Steven Vertovec's argument is based on empirical data of the city of London, that we can see a change in the structures of immigration and emigration to and from London. Superdiversity is diversification of diversity. What he wants to say with this catchphrase is, that London was always since the Roman Empire a diverse place, but that we can see more recently a significant diversification that increases the complexity of heterogeneity in the population of London. These complexification or increase in demographic heterogeneity is, according to Steven, related to globalization processes in general and migration patterns in particular. What he can see, what he can show is that we have a change in the general migration patterns after the Second World War are up to the 1970s, the immigration to London specifically and England in generally. That immi9gration was shaped by the post-colonial migration, there were relatively few numbers of sending countries like India, Pakistan, the Caribbeans, countries like Jamaica and African countries like Nigeria or Ghana. These persons came to Great Britain often to work and earn some money in the industrial sector of the country, often in the lower status of the employment structures. Of course, there were also students at the British University, but the large number of migrants were workers rather than businessmen or academics.

However, during the 1970s, a change happens first. The numbers of countries increase from which immigration to London happens. Secondly, the colonial or post-colonial ties lose significance for predicting the probability of immigration to London. Instead we can see a change in the structures that we don't have so many large groups that migrate, but that we can see small and medium sized groups of migrants coming from *more* countries than before. This led to the effect that we can meet people from all over the world and all countries of the world in London, including those that were not part of the

English empire. The large significance of that migration lead to demographic changes in London and also to overall complexity, creation of the demographic structures, we find in London. Not only people from all countries, but we find also terrific numbers of languages, we see different religions and different interpretations of religions. For instance, most global forms of Islam can be also found in the city of London, including the Sharia or the Sunni Muslims or Alawites, Sufis and so on. So not only the numbers of categories increase, like having people from Buddhism, Christianity or Islam or Judaism, but also the subcategories, called variation, increase. Muslims from Afghanistan might be very different from Muslim from Senegal or Christians from Nigeria might be different from those of Ethiopia. Moreover, the labour market structure changed and we find a larger segment of highly skilled laborers and professionals that come to London not to work in the lower section, but having well-paid jobs in the finance or the wider business sector.

So, also socially, economically, the status of many of migrants diversifies and we could now go through a number of categories and could see how migration processes lead to demographic complex diversification. Important for the understanding of the term of superdiversity is, that it is that is not an one dimensional process, but a multidimensional process. People are not only more diverse, but they are more diverse by *more* criteria. The big question, I think is, that it raises: what are the effects of superdiversity for our understanding of society and how should public policies change according to the insight in the demographic complex diversification? I will come back to this sociological question of how we can imagine that superdiverse societies create cohesion and solidarity among the diverse members that belong to these societies. But first, I want to give you some **empirical examples of diversification processes** and how they can be replaced.

Let's have a short look at the **city of Stuttgart**, the capital of the regional state of Baden-Wuerttemberg in which is Tübingen is situated. Stuttgart is not the most diverse city, neither in Germany nor in Württemberg. But it is a city that has experienced the considerable diversification in the decades after the Second World War until now. As you might know Württemberg is one of the most prosperous areas in Germany with a flourishing economy.

Stuttgart is and was dependent on the immigration of labor, especially in the 1950s, 60s. More industrial laborers were required in the industry, in the car industry in particular. But nowadays you have also a diversification of immigration, for instance, due to the specialization in engineering. You have, for instance, a considerable number of Chinese students coming to city of Stuttgart. If we now look at the statistics of migration to Stuttgart, we see a very significant change from the 1970s to today. In the table, in the left upper part of the screen, you see the numbers of the five largest countries of origin of migrants in Stuttgart in the year 1978. There you see also the total number of immigrants in Stuttgart in 1978: 95.413. And 80.5 percent of the foreign population came from five countries: Greece, Turkey, Italy, Yugoslavia and Spain. This reflects the recruitment policies that were implemented since the mid-1950s in Germany and lasted until 1973 when there was a recruitment stop. So, at the height of the so-called 'Gastarbeiter' or guest worker migration to Germany, there was a high concentration of the immigrants originating from only five countries. We now have a look at the numbers of 2016, which are in the table just below the one of 1978. We see that the numbers of immigrants have increased from 95.000 to 153.000 in the year of 2016.

Furthermore, we see that the number of migrants from the five largest countries of labor recruitment Greece, Turkey, Italy, Ex-Yugoslavia and Spain remained basically constant, but their share decreased from 80 percent to 56 percent. So, the decrease in the percentage of these five countries can be explained mainly by the increase of migrants in total. And by the changes in the structure of migration that was also described by Steven Vertovec for the city of London. The new migration to Stuttgart comes from a much larger variety of countries of origin and includes also people of a much larger variety of educational backgrounds, religions, languages and so on. Now, people with 173 different nationalities live in Stuttgart. Out of these one 173 nationalities, 77 percent are from Europe, 11.5 from Asia, 3.3 from Africa and 2.8 from the Americas. We see the changes to 78, 80 percent were only from five countries. Now 77 percent are from the whole continent of Europe. This shows that although the numbers of Asian, African, American migrants are relatively the minority of immigrants, their share has of these countries increased and shows that global migration flows have increased and are relevant for the demographic changes in Stuttgart. If we put this increase in an even larger historical perspective, we can see that the share of foreigners in Stuttgart increased from 1955 from 1.6 percent to 25 percent in 2016. If we count as it is done in Germany, only the persons of migration background, that means persons

who themselves or whose parents are either not born in Germany or not have a German passport. The percentage of persons with a migration family background increased to 45 percent: almost half of the population, at least one family member that is either not born in Germany or not has the German citizenship. Although the share of migrants is not equally distributed in Germany, we see an increasing numbers of neighborhoods and cities such as Offenbach, Heilbronn or Frankfurt, in which the German population without a migrant and migration background is in the minority, while more than 55 percent of the population has a migration background. Obviously, this has an impact on how we imagine the society and what we consider as mainstream culture, that to which newcomers should adapt.

One of the most significant social effects of diversification or superdiversity is that it changes our understanding of what a majority is and what we can consider culturally normal. In these cities and places it is increasingly normal to bring in a diversity of backgrounds, experience, history into the mainstream, and to imagine the society not of having one unitarian and holistic history and culture, but being a context in which different cultural influences and histories blend into a new, diverse normality of Germany as an immigration country.